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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid,
132 S. Ct. 680 (2012)
Synopsis:
A widow of an offshore drilling platform employee who was
killed while working on the onshore oil processing facility petitioned
for review of the order of the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review
Board denying her claim for benefits under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).1 The Board held
that Congress intended to limit the coverage provided by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to injuries suffered by
employees within the geographical zone of the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS).2 Upon review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Board’s decision and determined that, in order to qualify
for benefits afforded under the OCSLA, a claimant must establish a
“substantial nexus” between the injury and “extractive operations” on
the OCS.3 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
and upheld the Ninth Circuit’s ruling requiring a claimant to establish
a substantial nexus between the injury and the extractive operations
in order to qualify for the LHWCA benefits provided by the
OSCLA.4
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP (Pacific) operates two
drilling platforms on the OCS off the California Coast and an
onshore oil and gas processing facility.5 Pacific employed Juan

1

Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 680, 685

(2012).
2

Id. The geographical zone of the Outer Continental Shelf, known as
the OCS, refers to the “‘submerged lands’ beyond the extended state boundaries,
but not the waters above those submerged lands or artificial islands or installations
attached to the seabed.” Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 691.
5
Id. at 684.
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Valladolid as a general manual laborer, or roustabout, as part of its
oil exploration and extraction.6 Valladolid spent ninety-eight percent
of his time working on offshore drilling platforms, and the remainder
of his time working at the onshore processing facility. Valladolid
died while working at the onshore processing facility.7 Valladolid’s
widow filed a claim for benefits under the LHWCA, which had been
extended by the OCSLA.8 An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
dismissed the widow’s claim reasoning that Valladolid did not
qualify for the LHWCA benefits under the OSCLA because his death
occurred on the onshore facility, not on the offshore drilling
platforms on the OCS.9 The United States Department of Labor’s
Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision concluding that
Congress intended to limit the benefits to injuries that occurred
within the geographical zone of the OCS.10
Valladolid’s widow appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed
the Board’s order.11 The Ninth Circuit determined that the OCSLA
requires a claimant to establish a substantial nexus between the injury
and the extractive operations on the OCS.12 Thus, the fact that
Valladolid died while working at the onshore processing facility did
not automatically prevent him from qualifying for the LHWCA
benefits. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling regarding which employees
6

Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 684.
Id.
8
Id. The OCSLA provides that,

7

[w]ith respect to disability or death of an employee
resulting from an injury occurring as the result of
operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the
purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or
transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving
rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be payable
under the provisions of the [LHWCA].
43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2012).
9
Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 684–85.
10
Id. at 685. The ALJ and Board’s interpretation of the OCSLA
significantly narrowed which employees were eligible for the LHWCA benefits.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.

902

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

qualified for LHWCA benefits was the third Circuit Court of
Appeals’ ruling on this issue.13 Therefore, the Supreme Court
granted Pacific’s petition for writ of certiorari in order to resolve the
conflict over which employees qualified for LHWCA benefits under
the OSCLA.14
All of the Circuits and parties agreed that OCSLA covered
employees who were injured or killed while working directly on the
OCS; thus, the question for the Court remained whether the LHWCA
benefits extended to employees who were injured or killed during
extraction operations beyond the OCS.15 The Court first examined
the Third Circuit’s holding. The Third Circuit had established a “but
for” causation requirement in which an employee would qualify for
benefits if the injury would not have occurred “but for” operations on
the OCS.16 The Court rejected this approach as it would extend
worker’s compensation benefits to all employees of a business
engaged in extraction of natural resources on the OCS no matter the
cause or location of the injury.17 Thus, the Court determined that the
Third Circuit’s “but for” causation interpretation of the OCSLA was
too broad and did not comply with the language of the OCSLA or
Congress’s intent to compensate workers for injuries occurring as a
result of operations conducted on the OCS.18
The Court also rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “situs-of-injury”
interpretation of the OCSLA.19 The Fifth Circuit held that, in order
to be eligible for workman’s compensation, the injury must occur on
the OCS; thus the site of the injury would determine eligibility.20
The Court looked to the language of the OCSLA to determine that
requiring the injury to occur on the OCS was against Congressional
13

Id. Both the Third and the Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal had
previously ruled on similar cases. Id. However, each of the three Circuits that had
addressed this issue regarding employee qualification for LHWCA benefits had
established a different manner of determining qualification. Id. Thus, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to establish a unified manner of determining
qualification. Id.
14
Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 685.
15
Id. at 686.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 690–91.
18
Id. at 691.
19
Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 687.
20
Id.
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intent as the language of the act specifically allowed for employees to
recover for injuries that occurred as a result of the operations
conducted on the OCS.21 Considering that offshore platforms and
onshore processing facilities were often connected and employees
often worked on both sites, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
“situs-of-injury” interpretation as too narrow.22 The Court also
rejected the Solicitor General’s suggestion of a status-based inquiry,
which would apply two different standards to injuries that occurred
on the OCS and those that occurred off the OCS.23 The Court
acknowledged that this suggestion had merit, but determined that the
language of the OCSLA did not provide for a status-based inquiry,
and it was up to the Legislature, not the Court to enact new
legislation.24
After rejecting these three interpretations, the Court adopted
the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial nexus” interpretation. The Ninth
Circuit determined that an employee could qualify for benefits under
the OCSLA if he or she can show a substantial nexus between the
injury and the extractive operations on the OCS.25 Thus, the
employee must show a significant causal link between the injury he
or she suffered and the employer’s offshore operations conducted for
the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS.26 The
Court determined that this “substantial nexus” interpretation best
reflected the language of the OCSLA, and provided the ALJs and
courts with discretion to interpret an employee’s eligibility on a caseby-case basis.27 The Court then remanded the case to Ninth Circuit
for further proceeding.28

21

Id.
Id. at 687–88.
23
Id. at 690.
24
Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. at 690. In refusing to adopt the Solicitor
General’s status-based inquiry, the Court displays its adherence to its role of
enforcing the present legislation enacted by Congress, and leaving the drafting of
legislation to the Legislative Branch. Id.
25
Id. at 691.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
22
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Impact:
With this decision, the Court unified the manner in which the
employees’ eligibility for LHWCA benefits will be evaluated under
the OCSLA by establishing the “substantial nexus” test as the test to
apply. Having an established test to apply may lead to greater
consistency in the outcomes of these types of cases. However, the
“substantial nexus” test places the burden on the petitioner to show
the injury was substantially related to the offshore operations, which
may prove a difficult task, especially if an employee is killed and the
family must provide this information. Furthermore, the test provides
the ALJs and courts with a great amount of discretion in determining
whether a “substantial nexus” exists; thus, these decisions will
potentially be subject to multiple appeals.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012)
Synopsis:
The FCC issued notices of apparent liability against both Fox
Television Station (Fox) and ABC for violating the FCC’s indecency
enforcement regime.29 The alleged violations included two isolated
incidents of fleeting expletives during two Fox broadcasts, and the
brief showing of a nude buttocks of an adult female during NYPD
Blue on the ABC network.30 Both Broadcasters petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the FCC
order.31 The Second Circuit overturned the FCC order against Fox,
finding it unconstitutionally vague.32 The Second Circuit then
overturned the order against ABC based on its previous decision in
Fox.33 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the

29

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2316–17

(2012).
30

Id. at 2314.
Id.
32
Id. at 2315.
33
Id. at 2317; see ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 404 F. App’x 530, 533 (2d Cir.

31

2011).
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Fox and ABC cases.34 The Court determined that the FCC’s decision
to modify its indecency enforcement regime was not arbitrary or
capricious, but that the FCC’s orders, applied to the broadcasts in
question, were vague as the FCC failed to provide Fox and ABC with
sufficient notice of the change in the regime before issuing the
orders.35 Therefore, the Court set aside the orders.36
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Before discussing the facts of these cases, it is important to
understand the regulatory framework through which the FCC
regulates broadcast indecency. The FCC was tasked by Congress to
regulate the use of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language” on
both radio and television broadcasts.37 Historically, the FCC has not
sanctioned broadcasters for incidents of isolated or fleeting indecency
or obscenity.38 Even the framework established by the FCC to help
broadcasters determine when content is patently offensive refers to
“whether the material dwells on or repeats at length” obscene or
indecent content.39 However, in 2004, the FCC changed its
indecency enforcement regime with the Golden Globes Order, and
began issuing sanctions for isolated or fleeting incidents of indecency
or obscenity.40
There are three separate incidents of alleged indecency
involved in this case. The first incident took place during Fox’s 2002
broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards when singer Cher said
“f*** ’em” on live television.41 The second incident occurred during
Fox’s 2003 broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards when Nicole
Richie remarked “have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada

34

Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2317.
Id. at 2320.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 2312. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012).
38
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2313.
39
Id.
40
Id. See also In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees
Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd.
4975, 4976 n. 4 (2004).
41
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2314.
35
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purse? It’s not so f***ing simple”.42 The third incident occurred in
2003 when ABC broadcast the nude buttocks of an adult female
character for about seven seconds and the side of her breast for a
moment during an episode of NYPD Blue.43 These incidents all
occurred before the Golden Globes Order; however, the FCC applied
the new policy regarding sanctioning broadcasters for fleeting
expletives and nudity to all three incidents.44
The FCC applied its tripartite definition of patently offensive
material45 and the new Golden Globes Order allowing for sanctioning
of isolated or fleeting incidents of indecency to the two Fox
broadcasts involving expletives.46 The FCC found the expletives
actionable indecency, and Fox appealed to the Second Circuit.47 The
Second Circuit found the FCC order arbitrary and capricious as the
FCC changed its indecency enforcement regime without providing a
reasonable explanation.48 The Supreme Court then found that the
FCC order was not arbitrary or capricious as the FCC did not have to
provide a detailed justification for the change in policy, and the
reasons for expanding the scope of the enforcement regime were
rational. 49 Thus, the Court remanded the Fox case to the Second
Circuit.50 The Second Circuit then held that the FCC’s order against
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id. at 2315.
45
Id. The FCC’s tripartite definition of patently offensive includes the
following three factors:
43

1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or
depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 2)
whether the material dwells on or repeats at length
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; 3)
whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been
presented for its shock value.
In re Indus. Guidance on Comm’ns Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001).
46
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2315.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 2316.
50
Id.
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Fox was unconstitutionally vague and invalidated the FCC’s
indecency policy as the FCC failed to give notice to broadcasters of
what would be considered indecent under the new policy.51
The FCC also applied the same tripartite definition of patently
offensive material and the new Golden Globes Order to ABC’s
fleeting broadcast of nudity, and found the nudity patently
offensive.52 The FCC imposed a forfeiture on each of the 45 ABCaffiliated stations that aired the NYPD Blue episode.53 ABC
petitioned the Second Circuit for review of the FCC’s order, and the
Second Circuit vacated the forfeiture order based on its decision to
invalidate the FCC indecency policy in the Fox case. 54 The Supreme
Court consolidated the Fox and ABC cases, and granted certiorari.55
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
invalidation of impermissibly vague laws; thus, the Court had to
determine whether the FCC’s new indecency enforcement regime
was impermissibly vague.56 In order to avoid vagueness, the Court
asserted that regulated parties should know what the law requires of
them, and that precision and guidance are necessary to ensure
enforcement is not arbitrary or discriminatory.57 The Court then
looked to the policies in place during the incidents of alleged
indecency.58 All three of the incidents occurred prior to the FCC’s
change in their indecency enforcement regime; therefore, the Court
determined that the policy in place at the time of the broadcasts in
question did not provide Fox or ABC with notice that a fleeting
expletive or brief showing of nudity would be considered actionable
indecency.59 By failing to provide Fox and ABC with notice that
their policies regarding fleeting expletives and nudity had changed,
the FCC failed to adhere to its own regulatory standards of providing
“fair notice of what is prohibited.”60 Furthermore, the fact that the

51

Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2316.
Id. at 2316–17.
53
Id. at 2317.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2317.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 2318.
59
Id.
60
Id.

52
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FCC claimed it would not consider Fox’s prior indecent broadcasts in
any subsequent actions, was insufficient to remedy the constitutional
violation.61 Thus, the Court held that the FCC’s failure to provide
sufficient notice caused the standards applied to the Fox and ABC
broadcasts in question to be unconstitutionally vague and set aside
the FCC orders.62
Impact:
The Court resolved these cases on fair notice grounds under
the Due Process clause.63 Therefore, the Court has yet to address the
First Amendment implications of the FCC’s indecency policy.
Additionally, the Court only ruled that the broadcasters lacked notice
that their broadcasts would be actionably indecent under the thenexisting FCC indecency regime. The Court did not address the
constitutionality of the FCC’s new indecency policy under the
Golden Globes Order.64 Thus, the Court will likely have to address
both the First Amendment and constitutionality issues in subsequent
cases. Finally, the Court upheld the FCC’s right to modify its current
indecency policy depending on the FCC’s discretion regarding pubic
interest and legal requirements.65

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty
Board, 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) set default royalty rates and
terms applicable to Internet-based “webcasting” of digitally recorded

61

Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 2318.
Id.
63
Id. at 2320.
64
Id.
65
Id.

62

Fall 2012

Legal Summaries

909

music.66
Intercollegiate, an association of noncommercial
webcasters, appealed the CRJs final decision in Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, Inc. alleging that the position and authority of
CRJs violates the Appointment Clause.67 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated and remanded the
CRJ’s final decision, founding that the CRJ’s position violated the
Appointment Clause.68 The Court invalidated and severed the
restrictions on the Librarian of Congress’s ability to remove CRJs,
thus resolving the constitutional problem.69
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The Copyright Royalty Board was established in 2004 and is
composed of three Copyright Royalty Judges (CRJs) who are
appointed by the Librarian of Congress. This Board is the
administrative body responsible for adjusting and setting reasonable
rates and terms of royalty payments.70 In 2008, SoundExchange,
Inc., a non-profit clearinghouse for musicians’ webcast royalty
payments, initiated ratemaking proceedings before the CRJs to set
default rates for the years 2011-2015.71 Intercollegiate could not
reach a settlement regarding the default rates, and thus the CRJs
issued a final decision in which the CRJs adopted the royalty
structure of a $500 flat annual fee per station for both “educational”
and other noncommercial webcasters whose “Aggregate Tuning
Hours” stay below a monthly threshold.72 The CRJs specifically
rejected Intercollegiate’s proposal to establish different rate
structures for “small” and “very small” noncommercial webcasters
like Intercollegiate.73
Intercollegiate appealed the CRJs final decision pursuant to
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, 17 U.S.C.

66

Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
67
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
68
Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1334.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1335.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1335.
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§§ 803(d)(1) and (d)(3).74 Intercollegiate also alleged that the CRJ’s
power was unsuitable for an Article III court, however, the Court of
Appeals did not address this objection.75 Intercollegiate specifically
alleged that the CRJs violated the Appointment Clause art. II § 2, cl.
2 on two grounds: (1) the CRJs exercise a significant amount of
ratemaking authority without the effective control of a superior,
making them “principal” officers who must be appointed by the
President with Senate confirmation; and (2) even if the CRJs are
“inferior” officers, the Librarian of Congress is not a “Head of
Department” in whom Congress may vest appointment power.76
The Court of Appeals evaluated each of the alleged violations
in turn and agreed with Intercollegiate as to the first claim, but not
the second.77 Regarding the first violation, the Court looked at all of
the powers CRJs hold and determined that CRJs exercise significant
authority as they had broad discretion in determining reasonable
rates, and that their ratemaking decisions have considerable
consequences for entire industries.78 Furthermore, the Court applied
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) when evaluating
whether the CRJs were principal or inferior officers for purposes of
the Appointment Clause.79 The Court determined that because the
Librarian of Congress can only remove the CRJs for misconduct or
neglect of duty and because the CRJs decisions are final for the
executive branch, the CRJs are principal officers.80

74

Any aggrieved participant in the proceedings may appeal the CRJ’s
decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1) (2012). The Court of Appeals can modify or vacate a
determination of the CRJs and enter its own determination with respect to the
royalty rates or the Court may vacate the determination and remand the case back
to the CRJs for further proceedings. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (2012).
75
Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1336.
76
Id. The Librarian of Congress appoints the CRJs to the Copyright
Royalty Board for a staggered six-year term. Id. at 1333.
77
Id. at 1337.
78
Id. at 1338–39.
79
Id. The degree to which an officer is principal or inferior with
regards to the Appointment Clause depends on the degree to which that officer was
directed and supervised by a presidential appointee. Id. Therefore, the greater
amount of supervision the greater likelihood the officer will be inferior. Id.
80
Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1340.
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As the CRJs are principal officers, the structure of the
Copyright Royalty Board violates the Appointments Clause because
principal officers must be appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate.81 In order to remedy this violation, the Court of
Appeals invalidated and severed the restrictions on the Librarian of
Congress’s ability to remove the CRJs.82 By removing these
restrictions, the Librarian of Congress can direct, supervise, and exert
some control over the CRJ’s decisions.83 Thus, the Librarian of
Congress, as a principal officer, constrains the CRJs authority
making the CRJs inferior officers under the Appointment Clause.84
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected Intercollegiate’s second
allegation that the Librarian of Congress was not a “Head of
Department.”85 The Court determined that the Library of Congress
was a freestanding entity that met the definition of “Department” as it
performs a range of different services and is exercised primarily for
legislative purposes.86 Furthermore, as the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate appoints the Librarian of Congress, the
Librarian of Congress is a Head of Department as defined in the
Appointment Clause.87 Therefore, the Librarian of Congress has the
authority to appoint the CRJs.88
Impact:
Though the D.C. Circuit sought to resolve the constitutional
violations in a manner that would cause the least disruption possible
to the structure of the Copyright Royalties Board, the D.C. Circuit
essentially limited the authority of CRJs and the Copyright Royalties
Board. Even though their individual decisions are not reversible, the
81

Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2012).
Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1340.
83
Id. at 1341.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. The Library of Congress is a “freestanding component of the
Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such
component,” and thus “constitutes a ‘Department’ for purposes of the Appointment
Clause.” See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3162 (2010).
87
Intercollegiate Broad., 684 F.3d at 1341.
88
Id.
82
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threat of removal provides the Librarian of Congress with significant
influence over the ratemaking power of the CRJs. Thus, the
Copyright Royalties Board becomes subject to direct influence and
supervision of the Librarian of Congress. As the President with the
advice of the Senate appoints the Librarian of Congress, the
ratemaking decisions of the CRJs may become indirectly influenced
by the political and economic agenda of the Executive Branch.
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit refused to address Intercollegiate’s
arguments regarding the merits of the rates set by the CRJs. Thus,
the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to address this argument left it open and
subject to future challenges and litigation both at the Copyright
Royalty Board and the Appellate Court level.

Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA,
693 F.3d 169 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
Three trade organizations comprised of engine manufacturers,
petroleum suppliers, and food producers, petitioned for review of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) final decision to grant
Clean Air Act (CAA) partial waivers approving the introduction of
E15, a blend of gasoline and 15% ethanol, into commerce for use in
select motor vehicles and engines.89 The introduction of E15 was
pursuant to the renewable fuel standard (RFS) of the Energy Policy
Act.90 The D.C. Circuit dismissed all petitions for lack of
jurisdiction, as the D.C. Circuit determined that all three trade
organizations lacked standing.91
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress incorporated the
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) into the Clean Air Act (CAA).92
89

Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id.
91
Id. at 180.
92
Id. at 172. See also Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 1501(a), 119 Stat. 594
(2005) (RFS).
90
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The RFS requires qualifying refiners and importers of gasoline or
diesel fuel to introduce into United States’ commerce a specified
volume of renewable fuel.93 The refiners and importers primarily
blend corn-based ethanol into the fuel supply to meet the RFS
requirements.94 In order to bring a new renewable fuel to market, the
manufacturer must apply for a waiver of the CAA restriction, which
limits manufacturers from introducing into commerce “‘any fuel or
fuel additive […] which is not substantially similar to any fuel or
additive used in federal emissions certification.’”95
The
Administrator of the EPA may grant a waiver if he determines that
the applicant can establish that the fuel or fuel additive, or a specified
concentration thereof, and its emissions products will not cause or
contribute to a vehicle failing the emission standards.96
In 2009, Growth Energy applied for a CAA Section 211(f)(4)
waiver to introduce E15, a gasoline blend with fifteen percent
ethanol, into the market.97 The EPA granted Growth Energy two
partial waivers. The first waiver approved E15 for use in light-duty
motor vehicles from model year 2007 and later.98 The second waiver
extended the use of E15 in light-duty motor vehicles and engines
from model years 2001-2006.99 These waivers are conditioned on
the E15 manufacturers submitting a plan for the implementation of
“misfueling mitigation conditions” for approval by the EPA.100 After
the EPA granted these waivers, three trade organizations representing
engine manufacturers, petroleum suppliers, and food producers,
petitioned the court for review of the EPA waivers.101 The
Petitioners alleged that (1) the EPA lacks authority under the CAA
93

42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 173. The current national gasoline
supply consists of E10, gasoline blended with 10 percent ethanol. Id.
95
Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(f)(4) (2012).
96
Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 173.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. Misfueling refers to the use of E15 fuel in pre 2001 vehicles and
other non-approved vehicles, engines, and equipment. Id. The plan for
implementing misfueling mitigation conditions includes pump-labeling
requirements, participation in pump-labeling and fuel-sample compliance surveys,
and proper documentation of ethanol content on transfer documents. Id.
101
Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 173.
94
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section 211(f)(4) to grant partial waivers approving the use of E15;
(2) Growth Energy failed to meet a required evidentiary burden under
section 211(f)(4); (3) the EPA failed to provide sufficient opportunity
to comment on the waiver decision; and (4) the record does not
support the EPA’s decision to grant the partial waivers.102 The D.C.
Circuit never addressed the merits of the Petitioners’ claims as the
D.C. Circuit determined that none of the three petitioners had
standing, and thus dismissed all petitions for lack of jurisdiction.103
The D.C. Circuit first established that all three trade
organizations had standing to sue on behalf of its members; however,
the organizations needed to show that a member would have standing
to sue in his or her own right.104 Thus, the organizations needed to
show that approving the partial waivers for E15 caused any of their
members injury in fact for which the court could provide redress.105
The engine manufacturers’ organization asserted that the waiver
approving E15 injured their members because individuals will use
the E15 fuel in unauthorized vehicles and engines, thus causing harm
to the emission control devices and systems and subjecting the engine
manufactures to liability.106 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument
on two grounds. First, the engine manufacturers failed to provide
any evidence of a substantial probability that E15 would cause engine
harm.107 Second, the engine manufacturers based their theory of
causation on the acts of third parties, not the EPA’s granting of the
partial waivers.108 The engine manufacturers alleged that misfueling
would subject them to liability; however, any harm that might occur
would be caused by third party consumers who misfueled engines
with E15, not the actual approval of E15 by the EPA.109
Furthermore, the engine manufacturers failed to indicate why they
would be subject to liability for damages caused by consumer-
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Id. at 173–74.
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induced misfueling.110 Thus, the D.C Circuit determined the engine
manufacturers failed to establish standing to bring their petition.
The D.C. Circuit next looked to the standing of the petroleum
suppliers. The petroleum suppliers alleged that introducing E15 into
the market would subject their members to substantial costs including
special fuel production, transportation, and fuel segregation.111
However, the petroleum suppliers failed to show how these costs
were related to the EPA’s approval of E15’s use in certain
vehicles.112 By granting the partial waivers, the EPA in no way
forced, required, or encouraged the petroleum suppliers to introduce
the new fuel.113
The partial waivers simply provide fuel
manufacturers and petroleum suppliers the option of introducing the
new fuel.114 The petroleum suppliers have the choice whether to
assume the costs associated with dealing with E15; thus, any injury
which may stem from this choice is a self-inflicted harm that is in no
way traceable to the EPA’s granting of the partial waivers.115 As the
alleged potential liability of introducing E15 is assumed voluntarily,
and not traceable to the EPA’s actions, the petroleum suppliers also
lack standing to bring their petition.116
Finally, the D.C. Circuit examined the standing of the food
producers’ organization. The food producers alleged that the EPA’s
partial waivers approving the introduction of E15 would increase the
demand for corn; hence increasing the prices their members would
have to pay for corn.117 The food producers argue that this interest is
protected by the Energy Independence and Securities Act (EISA),
which requires the EPA to review the impact the use of renewable
fuels will have on the supply and price of agricultural commodities
when setting renewable fuel volume requirements.118 However, the
110
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Grocery Mfrs., 693 F.3d at 177.
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Id.
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D.C. Circuit determined that this argument lacked prudential standing
as the interest the food producers sought to protect, the price of corn,
was not within the zone of interests the CAA fuel waiver provision
sought to protect or regulate.119 The D.C. Circuit determined that
maintaining a low price of corn was too far removed from partial
waivers approving the introduction of renewable fuel sources;
therefore, the food producers also lacked standing to bring their
petition.120 After determining that none of the trade organizations
had standing, the D.C. Circuit dismissed all petitions for lack of
jurisdiction.121
Impact:
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit both clarified and
narrowed the petitioners who would have standing to challenge a
similar EPA waiver in the future. However, in mentioning that
petroleum suppliers might be forced to assume liability by the RFS,
the D.C. Circuit also provided a potential means for this trade
organization to establish standing and challenge similar EPA waivers
on alternative grounds. The D.C. Circuit also seemed to show
deference to the EPA and its findings regarding the appropriateness
of approving implementation of E15 into the United States’ market.
Furthermore, because the D.C. Circuit dismissed all petitions for lack
of jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit never addressed the merits of the
petitioners’ allegations. Therefore, as no precedent was established,
the D.C. Circuit and/or other Circuits will likely be presented with
similar petitions for review of EPA waivers.

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
In 2012, the EPA approved an interim final rule (IFR), which
permitted manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines to continue
119

Id. at 178. See also Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA,
287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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selling non-compliant engines if they paid nonconformance penalties
(NCPs).122 When approving the IFR, the EPA invoked the “good
cause” exception provided by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), and made the decision without providing formal notice or an
opportunity for comment.123 Manufacturers of compliant heavy-duty
diesel engines petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit for review of the IFR.124 The D.C. Circuit determined
that the EPA failed to meet the statutory criteria for invoking the
“good cause” exception, and therefore vacated the IFR.125
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
In 2001, the EPA, through the Clean Air Act (CAA), enacted
a rule requiring a 95% reduction in emissions of nitrogen oxide from
heavy-duty diesel engines.126 The EPA provided the industry nine
years to develop the necessary technologies for compliance, and
established the effective date as 2010, effectively referred to as the
2010 NOx standard.127 During the nine-year interim, most heavyduty diesel engine manufacturers invested in a technology called
“selective catalytic reduction” as this technology allowed the
manufacturers to meet the 2010 NOx standard.128 One manufacturer,
Navistar, invested in “exhaust gas recirculation” instead.129
However, this technology proved less effective, and the Navistar
engines failed to meet the 2010 NOx standard. 130 Navistar continued
to pursue this “exhaust gas recirculation” technology and continued
to sell the noncompliant engines for the past few years by utilizing
emissions credits, but these credits are running out.131 Thus, Navistar
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will soon be unable to sell the noncompliant heavy-duty diesel
engines in the United States.132
Recognizing that Navistar was running out of credits, the
EPA issued an interim final rule (IFR), which allowed manufacturers
of heavy-duty diesel engines, like Navistar, to continue selling noncompliant engines if they paid nonconformance penalties (NCPs).133
In order to issue the NCPs, the EPA must find the new emission
standard is “more stringent” or “more difficult to achieve” than a
prior standard, that “substantial work will be required to meet the
standard for which the NCP is offered,” and that “there is likely to be
a technological laggard.”134 The EPA determined that the 2010 NOx
standard met these three criteria as the new standard permits a
significantly smaller amount of emissions than the prior standard; the
standards will require substantial work as compliant engines will
require new technologies; and that there is likely to be a laggard
because an engine manufacturer, Navistar, has not met the
compliance requirements for technological reasons.135 Once the EPA
determined that the NCP criteria was met, the EPA set the penalty
amount and established the highest limit of emissions permitted for
the noncompliant heavy-duty diesel engines.136
When authorizing the NCPs, the EPA also forewent notice
and comment procedures by invoking the “good cause” exception of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The EPA justified this
action by claiming that notice and comment procedures were
impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to public interest.137
Specifically, providing for notice and comment would mean (1) the
possibility that an engine manufacturer would be unable to certify a
2012 and 2013 product line; (2) the EPA only amended limited
provisions in existing NCP regulations; (3) the IFR was for limited
duration; and (4) there was no risk to public interest in providing the
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Id. The EPA set the penalty amount at $1,919 per engine and the
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option of NCPs for manufacturers.138 In response, manufacturers of
compliant heavy-duty diesel fuel engines requested administrative
stay of the EPA’s IFR.139 The compliant manufacturers asserted that
the EPA lacked good cause when issuing the IFR, that the EPA
misapplied its own regulatory criteria for determining when a penalty
is warranted, and that the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously set the
amount of the penalty and the permissible emissions limit.140 The
EPA denied the manufacturer’s request for administrative review;
thus, the manufacturers petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the
EPA’s IFR. The D.C. Circuit determined that the compliant
manufacturers had standing as direct competitors to Navistar, and
thus granted the review.141
The D.C. Circuit had to determine whether notice and
comment requirements of the NCPs were impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to public interest, thus allowing the EPA to invoke the
good cause exception and dispense with notice and comment
requirements when issuing the IFR.142 First, the EPA determined that
the notice and comment requirement was not impracticable as the
main purpose of the IFR was to allow Navistar to certify a complete
product line of engines in the years 2012 and 2013 despite
noncompliance.143 Thus, notice and comment would have been
practicable as the IFR does not prevent any imminent threat to the
environment, safety, or national security, but instead only addresses
the potential economic harm faced by Navistar for noncompliance.144
Second, the D.C. Circuit examined whether notice and
comment was unnecessary by determining if the administrative
decision was routine, insignificant in nature and impact, and
inconsequential to the industry and to the public.145 The D.C. Circuit
determined that the IFR was not unnecessary as members of public,
specifically the compliant manufacturers, were greatly interested in
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the IFR decision and the impact it would have on the industry.146
Furthermore, the IFR was not routine or insignificant as the IFR
implemented an NCP that established a higher emissions limit and
penalty.147
Finally, the D.C. Circuit evaluated whether the notice and
comment would be contrary to public interest.148 The public interest
aspect of the good cause exception only applies in rare circumstances
when procedures presumed to serve the public interest would actually
harm the interest.149 However, in this situation, the only harm the
EPA suggests will occur is the economic harm Navistar might suffer
from not certifying a complete product line.150 The D.C. determined
that this argument failed to establish notice and comment was
contrary to public interest.151
As the EPA failed to establish that notice and comment would
be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to public interest, the EPA
incorrectly invoked the good cause exception when issuing the
IFR.152 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit vacated the IFR and remanded
the case for further proceedings.153
Impact:
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit reminded the EPA that it
must follow appropriate administrative procedures when invoking
IFRs. The NCPs are meant to be temporary means for manufacturers
to meet new compliance standards, and should only be available
when the manufacturers have made every effort to comply with the
standards. Thus, the NCPs are not meant to bail out manufacturers
who voluntarily continued to adopt a noncompliant technology.
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the EPA must prevent
NCPs from providing a competitive disadvantage to manufactures
who comply with new regulations, as these manufactures assumed
146
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the costs of developing and implementing compliant technologies.
Overall, with this decision, the D.C. Circuit established that any EPA
exceptions to new compliance regulations should be narrowly
construed and reluctantly countenanced154 and that the notice and
comment requirements of the NCPs process will be strongly
enforced.

Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
Environmental organizations brought an action against the
United States Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) challenging the FWS
delisting of the West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).155 The United States District Court
of Columbia granted the organization’s summary judgment
determining that the FWS violated the ESA by removing the West
Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel from the list of endangered species
when several criteria in the agency’s Recovery Plan for the species
were not satisfied.156 The FWS appealed the summary judgment, and
the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia
determined that the district court erred in its interpretation that the
Recovery Plan was binding on the Secretary of the Interior in his
delisting decisions.157 The D.C. Circuit also determined that the
FWS’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law;
thus, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the summary
judgment.158
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel historically lives
in the Southern Appalachian Mountains; however, in 1985 the Fish
154
155
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and Wildlife Service (FWS) documented only ten living squirrels and
deemed the species endangered.159 As required by the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), the FWS created a recovery plan for the
“conservation and survival” of the squirrel.160 The plan established 4
criteria that when accomplished the squirrel could be removed from
the list of endangered species.161 These criteria included: (1) the
squirrel population was expanding at a minimum of 80% across all
Geographic Recovery Areas (GRAs); (2) there is sufficient
ecological data and timber management data to assure future
protection and management; (3) GRAs are managed to ensure
sufficient habitat and habitat corridors; and (4) the existence of high
elevation forests is not threatened by pests or environmental
pollutants.162
In 2002, the FWS hired a biologist to investigate the
possibility of removing the squirrel from the endangered species
list.163 In 2006, the Secretary of the Interior relied on the
persistence164 of the squirrel population to determine that the
population was robust, and thus the squirrel no longer met the
definition of endangered or threatened.165 Furthermore, the Secretary
determined that the recovery plan criteria are not explicit reference
points for delisting a species, as the criteria do not specifically
address the five threat factors used for delisting a species.166
Therefore, the criteria only serve as guidance for the Secretary when
determining when recovery has been achieved and if a species should
be delisted.167
The Friends of Blackwater filed a complaint in the district
court alleging that the FWS violated the ESA by delisting the squirrel
159
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before meeting the criteria in the Recovery Plan, and alleged that the
use of persistence to delist the species was arbitrary and capricious as
it did not rely on the best available science.168 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Friends of Blackwater on
the grounds that the Secretary was bound by the criteria in the
Recovery Plan, and his decision to delist the squirrel without meeting
the criteria constituted a revision to the Recovery Plan without proper
notice and comment procedures as required by the EAS.169 The FWS
appealed the summary judgment, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted review.170
The D.C. Circuit first examined the Friends of Blackwater’s
claim that the criteria of the Recovery Plan must be met before a
species can be delisted.171 In order to resolve this, the D.C. Circuit
looked to the language of the ESA; however, they determined that the
statute was ambiguous.172 After looking at the legislative history and
structure of the ESA, the D.C. Circuit determined that, although the
Secretary was required to design and implement a Recovery Plan, the
Plan is only a statement of intention, not a binding contract on the
FWS or the Secretary.173 However, the D.C. Circuit was careful to
emphasize that the Secretary should use the Recovery Plan criteria as
guidance when making delisting decisions.174
Next, the D.C. Circuit evaluated whether the Secretary’s
reliance on persistence was arbitrary and capricious.175 The Friends
of Blackwater allege that because the Secretary failed to use
population-based data, the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious.176 However, the D.C. Circuit determined that the
Secretary was only required to use the best available data, and is not
required to conduct its own independent studies when determining
168
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whether to delist a species.177 The best available data requirement of
the ESA only prevents the Secretary from disregarding available
scientific evidence that is better or more reliable than evidence the
Secretary would rely on. In this situation, the Secretary adequately
showed that population data was not available, but data on the
persistence of the squirrels was available.178
Therefore, the
Secretary’s reliance on the persistence data to determine that the
squirrel population was no longer endangered was reasonable, and
not arbitrary or capricious.179
The D.C. Circuit determined that the Secretary reasonably
interpreted that the ESA does not require the Recovery Plan criteria
to be met before removing a species from the list of endangered
species, and that the Secretaries reliance on persistence data was not
arbitrary or capricious. Thus, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
courts’ summary judgment order.
Impact:
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit provided the Secretary of
the Interior with broad authority to determine when a species can be
removed from the list of endangered species. This decision
establishes that though the FWS must design and implement a
Recovery Plan when declaring a species endangered, the criteria in
this plan only serve as guidance when determining whether a species
should be removed from the list of endangered species. Thus, the
Secretary of the Interior retains the ultimate authority in determining
the status of allegedly threatened or endangered species.

Watson v. Solis, 693 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
In 2002, Patricia Watson (“Watson”) filed a claim for
survivor benefits under the Department of Labor’s Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000
177
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(“Act”).180 The Department of Labor denied Watson’s claim, finding
that she was not “incapable of self-support,” and therefore not
entitled to benefits under the Act as a “covered child.”181 Watson
filed a complaint in the district court seeking review of the
Department of Labor’s interpretation and application of the Act.182
The district court denied Watson’s motion for summary judgment
and dismissed her case with prejudice.183 Watson appealed the
district court’s decision, alleging that the Department of Labor acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying her claim for benefits.184 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted review
and determined that the Department of Labor did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in denying Watson benefits under the Act.185 Thus, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.186
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
In 2000, Congress enacted the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act in order to provide
benefits to employees with illnesses caused by exposure to radiation
and other toxic substances during their work for the Department of
Energy or its predecessor agencies.187 Under this Act the employees
or their eligible survivors could receive a lump sum payment of
$150,000 as compensation and medical benefits for covered
individuals.188 The Act determined that:
[A] covered employee’s child is eligible for
survivor compensation as a covered child if
said child: as of the employee’s death—
(a) had not attained the age of 18 years;
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(b) had not attained the age of 23 years and
was a full-time student who has continuously
enrolled as a full-time student in one or more
educational institutions since attaining the age
of 18 years; or
(c) had been incapable of self support.189
Watson’s father worked as a contractor for the Department of
Energy from 1954 to 1962, and he died from complications from
Hodgkin’s disease in 1964. When her father died Watson was
nineteen years old, was not a full-time student, worked as a waitress,
relied on her parents for economic support, and was declared a
dependent on her parent’s income tax returns.190 In 2002, Watson
filed claims for survivor benefits with the Department of Labor and
received a lump sum compensation of $150,000 as a survivor of a
covered employee with an occupational illness resulting from
radiation exposure.191 Later, Watson filed a claim for more
compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 7385s 3(d)(2)(c) of the Act,
claiming as a covered child she was “incapable of self-support” at the
time of her father’s death.192 The Department of Labor denied her
claim finding that she was not “incapable of self-support” as she
failed to provide evidence that she was “physically or mentally
incapable of self-support” as required by the Department of Labor’s
Procedure Manual to receive compensation under this section.193
Watson challenged the Department of Labor’s interpretation
of “incapable of self-support” in the District Court claiming the
Department’s requirement of a showing of physical or mental
incapability is impermissible.194 The District Court denied Watson’s
motion for summary judgment, and found that the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of “incapable of self-support” was persuasive.
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195

Thus the Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
denying Watson’s claim.196 Watson appealed the District Court’s
decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reviewed the District Court’s denial of the summary judgment de
novo.197
The Sixth Circuit determined that under section 7385s (6)(a)
of the Act, a court may only modify or set aside a federal agency’s
final decision regarding survivor benefits if the court finds that the
agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.198 This is a
deferential standard of review in which the decision will not be
arbitrary or capricious if the agency can present a reasonable
explanation, based on evidence, for the outcome of its decision.199 In
reviewing the Department of Labor’s interpretation of “incapable of
self-support,” the Sixth Circuit applied the two step process utilized
by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).200 Applying the two-step process, the Sixth Circuit first
determined that the term “incapable of self-support” is ambiguous as
it could refer to lacking financial capacity for independent support or
it could refer to lacking physical or mental ability to support
oneself.201
As the term is ambiguous, the Sixth Circuit then had to
determine if the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the Act was
permissible.202
The Department of Labor’s interpretation of
“incapable of self-support” is found in an agency manual; thus, the
permissibility of the interpretation must be determined by looking at
the thoroughness of its consideration, the validity of the reasoning,
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and its consistency with other Congressional interpretations.203
These factors determine whether the Department of Labor’s
interpretation of “incapable of self-support” as “mentally or
physically incapable of self-support” is persuasive, and thus
permissible.204 The Sixth Circuit first determined that the focus on
mental or physical disability was consistent with the established
Congressional interpretation that federal compensation programs
were generally meant to cover dependents incapable of self-support
due to “physical or mental disabilities.”205
This established
interpretation was also thoroughly considered as Congress has
adopted this interpretation of incapable of self-support since the mid
1920s.206 The Sixth Circuit also found that the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of “incapable” was persuasive as “incapable”
is commonly defined as “suffering from such a degree of mental or
physical weakness.”207 Furthermore, by adopting this interpretation
of “incapable of self-support,” the Department of Labor established a
class of identifiable beneficiaries, which remain consistent with other
federal statutes.208 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit determined the
Department of Labor’s interpretation to be persuasive.209
After determining that the Department of Labor’s
interpretation of “incapable of self-support” as physically or mentally
incapable of supporting one’s self was persuasive, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the Department of Labor did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in denying Watson benefits under section 7385s
3(d)(2)(c). The Department of Labor denied Watson’s claim because
she failed to provide evidence of a physical or mental condition,
which made her incapable of self-support.210 Watson only provided
evidence of her economic situation, despite the Department of
Labor’s requests for records of physical or mental disabilities.211 As
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standard practice, the Department of Labor requires evidence of
mental or physical disabilities when an individual claims benefits
under section 7385s 3(d)(2)(c).212 Watson failed to provide the
necessary evidence to meet the requirements for a claim of
“incapable of self-support,” thus the Department of Labor did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Watson’s claim for additional
compensation under the Act.213
Impact:
With this decision, the Sixth Circuit showed deference to the
Department of Labor and Congress’s established interpretation of
who is deemed eligible for federal benefit programs. This deference
effectively narrows the scope of covered individuals. The Sixth
Circuit may have upheld the narrow scope of qualifying individuals
for practical purposes. A broad interpretation of covered survivors,
as Watson advocates, would expand the definition of covered
survivors beyond those reasonably intended by Congress to have
access to federal benefit programs, and the broad interpretation
would quickly exhaust the financial capacity of federal benefit
programs and recovery funds. Thus, through this decision, the Sixth
Circuit recognized and upheld Congress’s established interpretation
of who constitutes a covered survivor.
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